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TIME TO START INTERVENING IN THE HUMAN GERMLINE? A UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
Focusing on present-day possibilities raised by existing technology, I consider the normative aspects of 
genetically modifying the human germline from a Utilitarian standpoint. With reference to a 
hypothetical case, I examine the probable consequences of permitting a well-conceived attempt to 
correct a disease-associated gene in the human germline using current CRISPR gene-editing 
technology. I consider inter alia the likely effects on Utility of creating healthy new lives, of discouraging 
adoption, and of kickstarting a revolution in human germline genetic modification (HGGM). I reject 
various objections to HGGM, including claims that the risks of genetic harm outweigh the likely 
benefits. From this Utilitarian analysis, I conclude that strong grounds exist to support intervening in 
the human germline using current technology. Delay in commencing such work will impose a Utility 
cost, because the longer we wait until commencing the HGGM revolution and moving towards a world 
of increased Utility, the greater will be the quantity of suffering accrued meantime through genetically 
influenced disease. Nevertheless, considering residual safety concerns and the negative publicity 
engendered by an ethically problematic recent (2018) first attempt at GM, it seems prudent –and 
ultimately generative of the greatest amount of Utility– to delay implementing HGGM for a modest 
period of time, in the order of 1-2 years. 
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, scientists have been able to genetically engineer the germline of mammals.1 
However, in most cases the modifications have involved incorporation of genetic sequences into 
essentially random sites within the genome.2 Gene targeting was only attainable at very low 
efficiencies. utilising ‘cloning’ technology that could not be applied to humans. All this has changed in 
the last few years, as new genetic modification (GM) technologies have rapidly emerged. It is now 
possible to reliably perform targeted genomic alterations in somatic and germline cells across a broad 
range of mammals.3 This technology could be used to intervene in the human germline, a prospect 
which presents major bioethical issues. 
The new GM technologies are based on biomolecules that have been adapted such that they 
can efficiently locate a specified genomic site and genetically modify that locus. Several such ‘designer’ 
biomolecules now exist, including inter alia ZFNs4, TALENs5, and CRISPR6, and it is no exaggeration to 
state that these agents have brought about a revolution in GM.7 At present, CRISPR biomolecules are 
1 Melo EO, Canavessi AMO, Franco MM, Rumpf R. (2007). Animal transgenesis: State of the art and 
applications. J Appl Genet. (48)1:47-61.
2 Smith K. Theoretical mechanisms in targeted and random integration of transgene DNA. (2001). Reproduction 
Nutrition Development. 41(6):465-485.
3 Chen Y, Niu Y, Ji W. (2016). Genome editing in nonhuman primates: Approach to generating human disease 
models. J Intern Med. 280(3):246-251; Lotti SN, Polkoff KM, Rubessa M, Wheeler MB. (2017). Modification of 
the genome of domestic animals. Anim Biotechnol. 28(3):198-210; Shrock E, Guell M. (2017). CRISPR in animals 
and animal models. Crispr in Animals and Animal Models. 152:95-114.
4 Zinc-finger nucleases.
5 Transcription activator-like effector nucleases.
6 Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats.
7 Sommer D, Peters AE, Baumgart A, Beyer M. (2015). TALEN-mediated genome engineering to generate 
targeted mice. Chromosome Res. 23(1):43-55; Gupta RM, Musunuru K. Expanding the genetic editing tool kit: 
ZFNs, TALENs, and CRISPR-Cas9. J Clin Invest. (2014). 124(10):4154-4161; Ohtsuka M, Sato M, Miura H, et al. 
IGONAD: A robust method for in situ germline genome engineering using CRISPR nucleases. Genome Biol. 
(2018). 19:25.
































































showing the greatest potential, largely due to the relative ease with which their sequence-recognition 
component can be programmed to target specific sites within the genome.8
Very recently (November 2018), scientist He Jiankui, at the Southern University of Science and 
Technology of China, announced the creation of the first GM babies.9 This work was apparently 
conducted in secret and, at the time of writing, has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Via 
a video posted on YouTube, He claims to have impregnated a woman with CRISPR gene-edited 
embryos, resulting in the birth of healthy twin girls. The modification entails knock-out of a genetic 
pathway exploited by HIV to infect cells.10 At a conference, He subsequently claimed that there is 
another pregnancy.11 The Chinese government has recently confirmed the births.12 
GM technology in general has generated a wide array of ethical concerns, and human germline 
genetic modification (HGGM) has engendered the greatest disquiet.13 It was no surprise that news of 
He’s experiment immediately led to a vociferous outcry of moral condemnation from media, society 
and many academics. More deliberatively, bioethicists have applied a broad range of normative 
approaches to various aspects and forms of GM. Utilitarianism is one of the most powerful of these 
approaches; this paper will evaluate the ethics of HGGM from a Utilitarian perspective.
. 
UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism is predicated upon the principle that ethical judgements should be based on the 
consequences arising, or likely to arise, from a course of action. Desirable consequences are those in 
which positive mental states (happiness, or ‘Utility’) outweigh negative mental states (suffering, or 
‘Disutility’), in aggregate across all affected individuals.14
While it is not a flawless moral theory, Utilitarianism possesses key features which render it 
valuable, including a high degree of int rnal consistency and a rational, analytical approach. 
Importantly, because happiness and suffering (in all their forms) are, respectively, highly valued and 
strongly deprecated by virtually all agents, conclusions generated by Utilitarian analysis arguably have 
the potential for broader acceptance than those derived using theories based on nonconsequentialist 
principles or religious precepts. Utilitarianism is particularly powerful as a tool for deciding whether 
the risk-benefit ratio of a proposed course of action is favourable – a central issue in much clinical and 
research ethics work. 
8 Hatada I, Horii T. (2016). Genome editing: A breakthrough in life science and medicine. Endocr J. 
63(2):105110; Mussolino C, Mlambo T, Cathomen T. Proven and novel strategies for efficient editing of the 
human genome. Current Opinion in Pharmacology. (2015). 24:105-112.
9 Cyranoski D, Ledford H. (2018). International outcry over genome-edited baby claim. Nature. 563(7733):607-
608; Normile D. (2018). Shock greets claim of CRISPR-edited babies. Science. 362(6418):978-979; Thulin, L. 
(2018).
10 The He Lab. (2018). About Lulu and Nana: Twin Girls Born Healthy After Gene Surgery As Single-Cell 
Embryos. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=th0vnOmFltc&app=desktop 
11 Greenfield A. Fearful old world? (2019). A commentary on the second international summit on human 
genome editing. Mammalian Genome. Lovell-Badge R. (2019). CRISPR babies: A view from the centre of the 
storm. Development. 146(3); What’s New, and What’s Not, in the Reported Birth of the CRISPR Babies. 
Retrieved from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/whats-new-whats-not-reported-birth-
crispr-babies-180970935/#wzBVAsMXFKIijFfQ.99.
12 South China Morning Post. (2019). China confirms birth of gene-edited babies, blames scientist he jiankui for 
breaking rules. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/2182964/china-confirms-
gene-edited-babies-blames-scientist-he-jiankui
13 van Dijke I, Bosch L, Bredenoord AL, Cornel M, Repping S, Hendriks S. (2018). The ethics of clinical 
applications of germline genome modification: A systematic review of reasons. Human Reproduction. 
33(9):1777-1796.
14 Scarre, G. (1996). Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.
































































While some ethicists (including the present author) are committed Utilitarians, most are not. 
For example, Kantians, Christian ethicists and Virtue ethicists work from precepts that are wholly 
different from, and largely incommensurate with, Utilitarian principles. Indeed, some ethicists are 
strongly opposed to Utilitarianism. Inevitably, many non-Utilitarian moral philosophers will disagree 
with the modus operandi of this article. However, most bioethicists are neither Utilitarians nor pure 
deontologists: many subscribe to some form of value pluralism, or sidestep foundational questions by 
relying on Principlism15 or Casuistry16. While such non-Utilitarian bioethicists do not consider Utility as 
decisive, most do consider it to be a relevant factor in ethical deliberations. Moreover, Utilitarian 
concepts are often borrowed by non-Utilitarian ethicists, such as Principlists and some Kantians.17 
Accordingly, this paper is of potential interest to a broad audience, including non-Utilitarian 
bioethicists. I suggest that it should be read by non-Utilitarians as offering pro tanto Utility-based 
arguments concerning the ethics of HGGM, which can be weighed against fundamental questions of 
ethical theory, consideration of which lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Several variants of Utilitarianism exist.18 Some forms seek to maximise Utility through indirect 
means; for example, through maximisation of preference satisfaction, or by establishing ethical rules 
to be followed in lieu of case-by-case Utility calculation. These variants, while being valuable in certain 
contexts, will not be used in the present paper. Instead, I shall employ a hedonistic Utilitarian 
approach, focusing directly on the metal states of individuals.19 Such Utilitarian deliberation entails 
cost-benefit analysis based upon an approximate quantification of Utility change, and this will be the 
approach taken in this paper in considering the ethics of proceeding with HGGM.
HGGM: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS
Once the technology is fully developed, the prospects for HGGM are substantial. Where the genome 
of one or both of a pair of prospective parents contains a known genetic sequence that causes a 
specific disorder, a bespoke GM strategy could permanently correct the disorder-associated sequence 
in an embryo conceived from these parents. In principle, this would offer a tantalising means for 
parents to eliminate or greatly reduce the risk of their child developing the disease in later life.20 It 
would also avoid the disorder-associated sequence being transmitted to any future descendants of 
the GM child.
Many common disorders, such as neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, autism), are 
polygenic in nature, meaning that several disparate genetic loci are involved, each serving as a risk 
15 Beauchamp, T. L, & Childress, J. F. (1994). Principles of biomedical ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
16 Jonsen, A. (1995). Casuistry - an alternative or complement to principles. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 
5(3), 237-251.
17 The ethicist R.M. Hare was perhaps the most prominent example of this, with his work explicitly blending 
Kantian and Utilitarian principles. (Hare, R.M. (1996). Essays on Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press).
18 The Utilitarian community itself is not monolithic, and I do not claim to speak for all Utilitarians. Many of 
those who consider themselves as Utilitarians will not necessarily accept all (or any) of the arguments and 
conclusions I present in this paper. Utilitarianism is not dogma, nor is it a scientific system for attaining 
absolute ethical truth. As with all plausible ethical approaches, there is always room for doubt and alternative 
conclusions amongst those who subscribe to its basic tenets.
19 The hedonistic form of Utilitarianism has been employed in this paper for two reasons, one pragmatic and 
one philosophical: it is a relatively straightforward tool of analysis, compared with alternative Utilitarian 
approaches; and it deals unambiguously with the central feature of Utilitarianism, namely Utility.
20 While HGGM has the potential to produce individuals who will avoid a disease that they otherwise would 
have been at risk of developing, it is arguably not a form of therapy, because it cannot treat any existing 
person. While GM can treat an embryo, it cannot treat a child on its way to coming into being, as this person 
(with the disease) would not exist if the GM intervention had not occurred. Accordingly, the term therapy (as 
in ‘germline gene therapy’, etc) will be avoided in this paper.
































































factor. Thus, a future goal of HGGM would be the ability to simultaneously modify multiple genomic 
sites in an individual embryo. 
The human germline per se is by no means ‘perfect’, with evolution having furnished us with 
rather minimal protection from diseases that tend to strike after the reproductive years. Humans in 
general are thus at risk from an array of genetically mediated medical problems including cancers and 
various degenerative disorders. In the future it will likely become possible to modify the human 
genome to protect against some of these common disorders. This has previously been achieved to an 
extent in GM experiments on non-human animals (mainly mice).21 If several common disorders could 
be avoided or delayed by HGGM, the average disease-free lifespan could be substantially extended.22 
Through disease-avoidance and disease-reduction, HGGM promises to boost Utility, and is 
thus a prima facie candidate for Utilitarian support. Increased Utility can be envisaged at two levels, 
individual and population. At the former level, HGGM would avoid suffering by the GM individual (and 
their loved ones) had the intervention not occurred. Regarding the population level, it is apposite to 
imagine two possible worlds: World A, with no HGGM, and World B, in which HGGM is used. World A 
will contain more disease and debility, and thus lower overall Utility, compared with World B. 
Utilitarians thus have good reason to support HGGM in principle, as a means to reducing future 
suffering. However, as with any new biotechnological innovation, questions of safety exist: if a GM 
approach inflicted genetic damage that led to increased suffering, this would be a Disutility, counting 
against it. More fundamentally, all currently plausible forms of HGGM would require IVF procedures, 
which would be costly and burdensome for prospective parents. And the availability of HGGM may 
have the unintended consequence of discouraging the adoption of children. The Disutility arising from 
these negatives must be factored into the Utilitarian calculus.
New GM technologies have moved us closer to the above prospects for HGGM. Applied to 
animal embryos, CRISPR technology can reliably induce highly specific genomic alterations, and it can 
be used to perform multiple locus alterations in a single embryo.23 Efficiency rates for CRISPR are 
already high and are continuing to improve, and very low rates of unintended mutations now regularly 
achieved.24 Nevertheless, the technology is not yet at a stage where it could reliably deliver many of 
the more ambitious goals above. This is compounded by an additional limitation: our scientific 
understanding of the links between genetic sequences and health remains at an elementary stage. 
While we have detailed genetic knowledge of many monogenic disorders, such as cystic fibrosis (CF), 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD), and Huntington’s disease (HD), we know far less about the 
genetic aetiology of polygenic disorders, such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and 
neuropsychiatric disorders. Therefore, many of the GM applications outlined above remain purely 
theoretical at present.
Looking further into the future, GM technology will likely become highly efficacious. This 
promises several Utility-promoting benefits, including correction of the random mutational damage 
that naturally occurs in everyone’s germline cells, and reversal of previous deliberate genetic 
21 For example, the addition of extra copies of tumour-suppressor genes to mice embryos has substantially 
reduced the resultant animals’ risk of cancer (for example see: Klatt, P. & Serrano, M. Engineering cancer 
resistance in mice. Carcinogenesis 24; 2003; 24: 817-826). Applied to humans, such genome engineering has 
the theoretical potential to reduce general cancer risk, with the descendants of the genetically modified 
individual also benefitting from the reduction in risk. 
22 Olshansky SJ, Perry D, Miller RA, Butler RN. (2006). In pursuit of the longevity dividend. Scientist. 20(3):28-
37.
23 See for example: Lee, H. K, Willi, M, Smith, H. E, et al. (2019). Simultaneous targeting of linked loci in mouse 
embryos using base editing. Scientific Reports, 9, 1662. Zhang, J, Cui, M, Nie, Y, et al. (2018). CRISPR/Cas9-
mediated specific integration of fat-1 at the goat MSTN locus. Febs J, 285(15), 2828-2839.
24 See for example: Li C, Zhou S, Li Y, et al. (2018). Trio-based deep sequencing reveals a low incidence of off-
target mutations in the offspring of genetically edited goats. Frontiers in Genetics. 9:449. Midic, U, et al. 
Quantitative assessment of timing, efficiency, specificity and genetic mosaicism of CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene 
editing of hemoglobin beta gene in rhesus monkey embryos. Hum.Mol.Genet. 26; 2017; 26: 2678-2689.
































































modification should this ever be required. It might also become possible to genetically modify sperm 
cells. Although genetic engineering of sperm is inherently limited to modifying only the paternal 
contribution to the child’s genome, a sperm-mediated approach in combination with artificial 
insemination (AI) would make intervening in the germline much easier (and cheaper) than embryo-
based approaches. This would permit widespread use of HGGM, as opposed to the technology being 
available only to affluent nations or individuals.25
Beyond modifications to prevent disease, future GM technology could also be used to 
enhance normal human functioning. Enhancements might include improvements to abilities such as 
eyesight, physical strength, or endurance. The brain might also be enhanced, such as to boost 
cognitive ability (this has already been achieved in genetically modified mice26), or –most 
controversially– to alter morally-relevant behavioural tendencies.27 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY USE OF TECHNOLOGIES
It is valid, and necessary, to discuss the ethical implications arising from highly futuristic HGGM 
applications, such as the creation of humans with enhanced abilities, because it seems inevitable that 
the technology will, one day, become good enough to reliably alter the germline such that these 
scenarios are no longer science fiction. However, this paper will put distant future possibilities aside 
and focus instead on the technology as it currently exists, in order to address the ethics of applying 
available GM techniques to humans. This early-use possibility is of prime ethical interest per se; and it 
is also important in that the initial attempts at modifying the human genome will serve as the crucial 
first steps towards more advanced applications.28
The importance of ‘first steps’ can be illustrated with the paradigm case of IVF. Hitherto 
restricted to animals, in the 1970s IVF was attempted with a human couple, leading to the birth of a 
healthy child. This bold step –which was conducted in secret and largely avoided prior ethical scrutiny– 
kickstarted the revolution in IVF that has transformed the treatment of infertility.29 Had risk-averse 
precaution been enacted at the time, preventing the first-use human IVF attempt, the development 
of this valuable reproductive technology would likely have been delayed substantially. 
However, by citing the IVF case I am not arguing for a simple laissez-faire approach towards 
HGGM. The first IVF attempt can be criticised on various ethical grounds. And a lack of caution in 
medicine can lead to serious negative outcomes, as evidenced by medical tragedies such as the 
25 K. Smith and C. Spadafora. Sperm-mediated gene transfer: applications and implications. Bioessays 27; 2005; 
27: 551-562.
26 Lehrer J. (2009). Small, furry .. and smart. Nature. 461(7266):862-864.
27 Harris J. (2010). Enhancing evolution: The ethical case for making better people. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.
28 In one sense, it can be said that the human germline has been subject to intervention since the late 1990s, 
because a (small) number of babies have been born following ‘mitochondrial replacement therapy’ (MTR). 
MTR is carried out at the oocyte/embryo stage, and a number of different MTR techniques have been 
developed: in all cases the goal is to ensure that native (mutation-containing) mitochondria are replaced with 
mitochondria from a donor individual. MTR thus allows a woman whose mitochondria contain a mutated gene 
to produce a child who will not inherit the disease associated with the mutation-carrying mitochondrial 
genome. However, while MTR is certainly of ethical importance, and may be described sensu stricto as ‘GM’, 
MTR comprises a bulk swapping of entire sets of genes (i.e. those contained within the mitochondria), as 
opposed to the specific modification of genetic sequences via GM technologies such as CRISPR. This places 
MTR in a separate category from HGGM as commonly understood. Thus, detailed consideration of MTR lies 
outside the scope of the present paper. For further discussion on the distinction between MTR and HGGM of 
the sort that is the subject of the present paper, see:Newson AJ, Wrigley A. (2017.) Is mitochondrial donation 
germ-line gene therapy? Classifications and ethical implications. Bioethics.;31(1):55-67. For a discussion of the 
ethics of MTR see:Rulli, T. (2016). What Is the Value of Three-Parent IVF? Hastings Center Report 46(4): 38-47.
29 
































































epidemic of birth defects caused by the inadequately tested drug thalidomide.30 Moreover, an early 
attempt to apply a new technology that results in failure or damage to health risks doing the converse 
of priming a biomedical revolution, producing instead a proscriptive response from society and 
regulators. If the technology in question is inherently of potential benefit, the chilling effect on its 
development resulting from a failed early attempt would be an unfortunate and undesirable 
consequence. 
The claimed creation of the first GM humans by He Jiankui, as described above, is apposite 
here. The possibility exists that He’s experiment will prove to have been safe and successful. But from 
what is known so far, the portents are not good. This is so for several reasons, including:
 The experiment was designed to create children who would be resistant to infection from a 
particular strain of HIV; all the children were produced using sperm from fathers infected with 
HIV, but there was no need to use GM for this purpose, as sperm-washing techniques are 
available that reliably remove HIV particles from sperm.
 Independent scientists examining preliminary data have expressed concerns that there 
appears to be evidence of mosaicism in placental material and an off-target edit in one 
embryo sample. These occurrences, if they have affected the GM babies, could mean that the 
goal of HIV resistance has not been achieved, and they raise safety concerns.
 There are questions around whether institutional ethical approval was obtained for the work.
 It is unclear whether the parents had freely given their informed consent.
The response to He’s experiment from media and society has been heavily negative, and it seems 
likely that scientific freedom in this area will be curtailed rather than liberated by what appears to 
have been an ill-conceived, ethically fraught and not entirely successful experiment. However, the 
seemingly botched nature of He’s attempt does not imply that HGGM is inherently undesirable. As 
described above, major benefits to humanity are likely to accrue from the ability to modify the human 
genome. Realisation of these benefits depends upon the development of effective HGGM 
technologies, and such development cannot come to fruition in the absence of actual attempts to 
create GM humans. As opposed to simply banning HGGM –as called for by many commentators 
following He’s experiment– for Utilitarians the correct approach to decide whether it is right to 
proceed at the present time with HGGM is to weigh up the relevant risks and probable benefits in 
terms of their likely effects on Utility.
EARLY-USE POSSIBILITIES
The disorders most amenable to GM technology are monogenic conditions with high penetrance, in 
which the association between gene and phenotype has been thoroughly established. For such 
disorders an appropriate GM strategy could be devised based on current technology which could be 
applied to embryos from parents whose genome(s) harbour the aberrant gene. Because the necessary 
technology is well established in transgenic animal research, such a strategy should have a high 
probability of success; and the concomitant avoidance of an otherwise inevitable serious medical 
condition would yield a high Utility. This combination of high magnitude and probability of benefit 
gives Utilitarians prima facie reason to view serious high-penetrance monogenic conditions as 
appropriate candidates for early-use HGGM.
However, well-characterised monogenic disorders can already be avoided using existing 
technology, namely pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).31 Consider for example sickle cell 
anaemia (SCA). This severe form of anaemia is associated with serious health problems including pain, 
30 Vargesson, N. (2015).Thalidomide-induced teratogenesis: History and mechanisms. Birth Defects Research. 
2: 140-156.
31 Harper JC. (2018). Preimplantation genetic screening. J Med Screen. 25(1):1-5,
































































swelling, infection, and cardiovascular damage.32 SCA occurs in individuals homozygous for a mutated 
β-globin gene. Where a pair of prospective parents are heterozygotes, there is a 1 in 4 probability that 
any child they produce will be homozygous for the mutant gene, and thus develop SCA. However, PGD 
can be utilised in such cases: IVF is used to produce embryos, which are grown briefly in vitro until 
comprising a suitable number of cells, at which point a biopsy is taken for genotype testing. Embryos 
typed as homozygous (or heterozygous) for the wild-type β-globin gene can then be selected for 
uterine transfer and gestation. 
GM could in principle be used to the same end. Experiments with cells have established that 
it is possible to use GM techniques to correct the mutant β-globin gene.33 Adapting this to the human 
embryo, a possible strategy would involve delivery of CRISPR biomolecules designed to target the β-
globin gene, along with a correction template DNA molecule based on a wild-type β-globin gene 
sequence; the template sequence would interact with the genome at the CRISPR-targeted location, in 
a process known as homology-directed repair (HDR), thus overwriting and correcting the genetic 
aberration.34 Treated embryos would then be grown in vitro and subject to genetic sequencing, to 
allow selection of embryos in which the desired modification had been achieved.
Various CRISPR-based strategies are possible for other monogenic disorders, with proof-of 
concept demonstrated in cell and animal GM studies. For example, DMD, an X-linked disorder 
dominant caused by a non-functional dystrophin gene, might be avoided by using CRISPR to delete a 
key RNA splicing sequence, allowing a modified functional gene product to be expressed.35 And some 
dominant disorders might be avoided by using CRISPR to knock-out an aberrantly expressing gene, 
such as mutant huntingtin in HD.36
Because PGD can used to avoid inherited monogenic disorders such as SCA, DMD and HD, it 
would arguably be ethically problematic to attempt GM as an alternative. Use of the former 
technology in humans is well established and has no special safety concerns (beyond the risks 
associated with IVF), while GM approaches are unproven in practice. I will argue later in this paper 
that the health risks from current GM techniques are likely to be low. However, any additional risk 
would be difficult to justify, given that present GM technology offers no clear advantages over PGD 
for these conditions. Nevertheless, Utilitarians have good reason to support attempting GM in place 
of PGD on the basis that it would bring about an important wider benefit, namely the kickstarting of a 
revolution in HGGM, leading to the development of technologies able to deal with polygenic 
conditions and provide broad improvements to human health. 
Moreover, in some cases PGD is of no use, namely where all conceptuses will contain the 
disease-causing sequence. For example, where both prospective parents are homozygous for the 
mutant β-globin gene (and thus affected with SCA), no embryo they produce will contain a wild-type 
β-globin gene. PGD is also ineffective where one parent is homozygous for a dominant disease-causing 
allele. For example, an individual whose huntingtin genes are both of the mutant type can only give 
rise to embryos that contain a disease-causing gene. It is such couples who would be potential 
candidates for early-use HGGM. A hypothetical couple will be used later in this paper to discuss the 
32 Karayalcin, G, Rosner, F, Kim, K.Y, et al. (1975). Sickle-cell anemia - clinical manifestations in 100 patients and 
review of literature. Am J Med Sci. (269)1: 51-68.
33 Bauer DE, Brendel C, Fitzhugh CD. (2017). Curative approaches for sickle cell disease: A review of allogeneic
and autologous strategies. Blood Cells Molecules and Diseases. 67:155-168.
34 Devkota, S. (2018). Strategies to enhance the frequency of homology-directed repair (HDR) for increased 
efficiency of CRISPR/Cas-mediated transgenesis. BMB REPORTS. (51): 437-443; Van den Bosch, M, Lohman, 
P.H, Pastink, A. (2002). DNA double-strand break repair by homologous recombination. Biological Chemistry. 
383:873–892.
35 Wong TWY, Cohn RD. (2017). Therapeutic applications of CRISPR/cas for duchenne muscular dystrophy. Curr
Gene Ther. 17(4):301-308.
36 Su Yang et al. CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing ameliorates neurotoxicity in mouse model of Huntington's 
disease. J.Clin.Invest. 127; 2017; 127: 2719-2724.
































































ethical issues around an early use of HGGM technology. Before this, an important alternative option 
to HGGM will be discussed: adoption.
IS ADOPTION THE ETHICALLY PREFERABLE SOLUTION?
Two forms of reproductive technology are available to prospective parents who cannot use PGD: 
donor insemination and embryo donation. And a third, non-technological way to prevent transmission 
of a genetic disorder is also available: adoption. Before discussing the ethical aspects of HGGM per se, 
I shall consider whether adoption might be ethically preferable. This may seem a digression, but it is 
not: procreative choice is a crucially important factor in the ethics of reproductive technologies, and 
is thus highly relevant to the ethics of HGGM.37
In contrast to PGD or HGGM, donor insemination or embryo donation will produce a child who 
is genetically related to only one of the parents; and adoption entails that neither parent is related to 
the child. Many couples have a strong desire to have children that are genetically their own. This well-
known and commonplace –although certainly not universal– strong desire is evidenced by the 
substantial financial and emotional costs borne by many infertile couples who choose to use 
reproductive technologies to produce a related child. It is therefore to be expected that many 
prospective parents at risk of transmitting a genetic disorder, for whom PGD is not possible, will prefer 
HGGM –if they perceive it to be sufficiently effective and safe– over adoption. 
The fact that many prospective parents desire genetic relatedness, and use reproductive 
technologies to secure a related child over adoption, does not amount to a moral argument in favour 
of relatedness.38 From a Utilitarian perspective, we must ask: which is preferable, [a] adoption, or [b] 
a technological solution? It is well-known that, worldwide, many orphans are languishing in 
institutions or surviving on the street; it may reasonably be assumed that they have lives that are on 
average of substantially reduced happiness compared with other children. Therefore, if option [a] 
pertains, a substantial Utility gain will occur whenever any of these children become adopted by caring 
parents with the means to support them. If instead the prospective parents opt for [b], the effect will 
be to add Utility to the world by creating a child who is likely to experience a happy existence.39
It is difficult to assess the relative Utility gains likely from [a] the enhancement of an existing 
life through adoption versus [b] the creation of an additional happy life, and therefore difficult to 
determine with certainty which option is preferable. More fundamentally, the notion that the creation 
of extra happy lives can compete with the quality of existing lives is contentious. Utilitarianism seems 
to entail that it is ethically desirable to increase Utility through the creation of happy lives, a position 
I shall refer to as the Utilitarian Total View (UTV). But this view is intuitively unappealing, and leads to 
what Derek Parfit has famously called the Repugnant Conclusion:
Compared with the existence of many people who would all have some very 
high quality of life, there is some much larger number of people whose 
existence would be better, even though these people would all have lives that 
were barely worth living. 40
Avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion (RC) is one of the major motivations for rejecting the UTV. 
However, rejection of this view seems to imply rejection of Utilitarianism more generally, since the 
summation of happiness in aggregate is a central Utilitarian principle. Accordingly, some Utilitarians 
37 Rulli, T. (2016). The Ethics of Procreation and Adoption. Philosophy Compass 11(6): 305–315.
38 Rulli, T. (2016). Preferring a Genetically-Related Child. J Moral Philos. 13(6): 669-698.
39 Not all ethicists agree: anti-natalists hold that to bring a person into existence is inevitably to harm that 
person. See for example: Benatar, D. (2008). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
40 Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
































































have argued that the RC is unavoidable and thus ought to be accepted.41 Such pro-RC positions are 
based either on the grounds that our intuitions are outweighed by the strong theoretical basis of 
Utility quantification, or that our intuitions are deceiving us, with the apparently counterintuitive 
nature of the RC being an illusion.42 However, while these RC-accepting approaches have the merit of 
consistency in respect of the principle of Utility aggregation, they remain intuitively and 
philosophically unappealing to most ethicists, including many Utilitarians.
The RC may not be a practical ethical issue: in the current world, the creation of additional 
lives through current reproductive technology would not be of sufficient magnitude to substantially 
(if at all) reduce the average level of Utility.43 Utilitarian bioethicists may thus choose simply to ignore 
the theoretical implications of adding more lives, sidestepping the RC. While this may be a practical 
solution, it is intellectually unsatisfying, and this has motivated various arguments in defence of the 
notion that the addition of happy lives is desirable yet does not entail the RC. I shall call this notion 
the Limited UTV. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the forms of Limited UTV that have 
been proposed by various ethicists; suffice it to say that, despite many such attempts, the RC remains 
a substantial and largely unresolved philosophical issue in Utilitarianism.44 Given this reality, I shall 
argue from a Utilitarian position that does not depend upon the UTV. Nevertheless, I shall refer to this 
view where relevant to the discussion.
The foregoing considerations about the merits of creating versus improving lives might be 
considered relevant by individuals making personal moral decisions about founding a family. Certainly, 
the arguments will be salient for those who consider themselves to be Utilitarians. Genetic relatedness 
is not of itself a source of Utility, and there is much to be said in favour of a personal decision to 
enhance the life of an existing child by adoption, considering the substantial Utility increase that is 
likely to accrue. For Utilitarians who reject the UTV, adoption appears to be the morally superior 
option since, according to this perspectiv , the happiness gained by rescuing an existing child is 
factored into the Utilitarian calculus, but the Utility produced by creating an additional life does not 
count.
However, it seems probable that most prospective parents who strongly desire a genetically 
related child are unlikely to be swayed by such arguments. If so, and if we assume that Utilitarian 
reasoning favours adoption over technology (i.e. that the UTV is invalid), it follows that prospective 
parents who are at risk of transmitting a genetic disorder would need to be disallowed access to HGGM 
technology (once it becomes available), so that they have no option to have a (healthy) child other 
41 Huemer M. (2008). In defence of repugnance. Mind. 117(468):899-933;
42 For critical discussions of these arguments, see: ibid; Pummer T. (2013). Intuitions about large number cases. 
Analysis. 73(1):37-46; Thomas T. (2018). Some possibilities in population axiology. Mind. 127(507):807-832.
43 It may be that anthropogenic climate change requires a smaller population in the future, to avoid a 
reduction in average Utility through environmental damage. There is no serious scientific doubt that climate 
change, unless it can be reversed or mitigated, looks set to have major negative consequences for humanity in 
the future. However, in the context of the present paper, it is likely that children born into the present world 
will not experience a substantial lowering of average Utility due to the contribution to global warming made by 
their existence. While some ethicists have argued for restrictions on fertility on account of climate change –see 
for example: Earl, J, Hickey, C, Rieder, T.N. (2017). Bioethics 31(8): 582-589– others disagree that procreation 
contributes significantly to global warming – see for example: Lomborg, B. (2018, May 30). Global warming – 
now they’re even blaming babies. The Australian. For Utilitarians, the issue of population growth and global 
warming is complex, and its detailed consideration lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. See for 
example: Scovronick, N, Budolfson, M.B, Dennig, F, et al. (2017). Impact of population growth and population 
ethics on climate change mitigation policy. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 114(46): 12338-12343.
44 Parfit himself, subsequent to conceiving and elucidating his Repugnant Conclusion, has argued in favour of a 
Limited UTV. For an elucidation of his attempted solution, and a valuable discussion of the flaws of various 
alternatives to the Total View, see: Parfit D. (2016). Can we avoid the repugnant conclusion? Swedish Journal 
of Philosophy. 82(2):110-127. 
































































than through adoption.45 Such a rule would reduce the parents’ Utility, by denying them the ability to 
satisfy their strong desire to have a genetically related child. But the balance of Utility might still be in 
favour of adoption: it seems reasonable to assume that, in most cases, the Utility gained by a child 
rescued from a very unhappy existence would outweigh the Utility loss caused to the parents through 
being denied the means to produce a genetically related child.
There is however a practical problem with a rule intended to promote adoption by preventing 
access to reproductive technologies: while some prospective parents may decide to adopt, many 
others may opt not to have a child at all. And it is plausible to think that many of those who would 
adopt might have done so regardless of the rule, since in many cases they would be individuals who 
happened not to possess a strong desire for genetic relatedness. All this would count against the rule, 
because a society in which Utility was lost through thwarting of parental desire, with only a small 
Utility gain from additional adoptions, would be less desirable than a society in which parental desires 
were satisfied, with a concomitantly higher level of Utility. 46 Of course, this position is tentative, as 
we cannot be certain as to how people would actually feel and respond in the face of such a rule.47
I conclude that, while adoption per se is strongly supported on Utilitarian grounds, arguments 
favouring adoption over reproductive technology do not amount to a convincing refutation of the 
position that in principle HGGM ought to be supported by Utilitarians. On this basis, I turn now to 
consider the hypothetical case of a pair of prospective parents, who I shall refer to as Couple X, both 
of whom suffer from SCA, and are potential candidates for HGGM.
COUPLE X
That both members of the couple suffer from SCA is a realistic scenario, as the disease-associated form 
of the β-globin gene is present at a high frequency within several populations worldwide.48 Suppose 
Couple X wish to have a SCA-free child, and they strongly desire this child to be genetically their own. 
PGD is not possible, as all their embryos will be homozygous for the mutant gene. Now suppose a 
group of scientists is willing to make (and fund) a HGGM attempt, of the type described above.49 
Would it be ethically acceptable to allow this attempt?
45 It may be possible to ‘educate’ some of these parents such that they change their mind and willingly opt for 
adoption instead of a genetically related child, however it would appear implausible to imagine that an 
educational strategy would persuade the majority of such parents to adopt instead of opt for a technological 
solution (assuming it to be affordable, safe and effective), given the strong emotional desire for relatedness 
that is commonly observed among many would-be parents.
46 If the UTV is correct, such reproductive autonomy would also be desirable insofar as it led to the creation of 
extra (happy) children (through HGGM) who otherwise would not have been born.
47 Some empirical research has been published on the effect of liberalising reproductive technologies on 
adoption rates. The results suggest that increased availability of IVF does not appear to drive a reduction in 
adoption rates. However, this research is of a preliminary nature, and the findings are specific to particular 
jurisdictional and economic contexts, meaning that generalisation is highly limited. See: Cohen, G. & Chen, D.L. 
(2010). Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should It Matter? Minnesota Law Review. 95(2):485-577.
48 This is so especially in Africa; in some regions of sub-Saharan Africa the disease-associated gene is carried by 
up to ca. 40% of the population. See: World Health Organisation. Sickle-cell anaemia: report by the Secretariat. 
World Health Assembly A59/9; 2006. 
49 The notion of individual couples, as opposed to a traditional clinical trial involving large numbers of 
participants, is realistic. Any application of CRISPR would require to be carefully tailored to the genetic 
constitution of each pair of prospective parents, even where the same genetic disorder is being targeted. 
Therefore, each initial HGGM attempt is likely to take the form of a bespoke project involving specific couples. 
However, this is not to say that there will not be a substantial number of couples seeking GM; there may well 
be large numbers, but each will likely have to receive an individualised treatment.
































































This is a complex question, and I shall answer it in several broad stages: I will first consider 
whether the attempt is likely to be successful; I will then briefly address nonconsequentialist 
objections to HGGM; before moving to consider issues of harm, risk, consent and precaution. 
As described above, CRISPR could be deployed on embryos from Couple X, with the aim of 
correcting of one or both mutant β-globin genes. Mice are the main testbed for HGGM techniques, 
and recent studies have consistently shown impressive results for the effectiveness of CRISPR-based 
germline GM: embryo survival rates of around 95% following delivery of CRISPR biomolecules and 
template DNA have been obtained, and HDR-mediated correction rates of over 90% have been 
achieved in the surviving embryos.50 Such work demonstrates the that CRISPR-based GM can be highly 
effective.
In 2015, the first CRISPR-mediated GM attempt on human embryos was published: in a study 
that was widely reported by the news media, researchers in China reported that 71 from 86 (82.6%) 
tripronuclear51 embryos survived CRISPR treatment, of which 7 (9.9%) had undergone HDR-mediated 
modification of the β-globin gene.52 Subsequently, a separate group targeting other genomic sites, 
also in tripronuclear human embryos, reported similar results (13.0% HDR).53 Most recently, a group 
targeting the myocardial disease hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM) gene have reported HDR-
mediated correction in 13 from 18 human embryos, a success rate of 72.2%.54 Notably, this latest work 
employed normal (not tripronuclear) human embryos, which may in part explain the higher success 
rate.55
From the above work, the chances of success of a CRISPR-mediated germline correction in 
embryos from Couple X should be high. Would this approach likely produce a gene-corrected child in 
practice? Suppose that, for Couple X, superovulation yields 10 eggs (a typical number); from the above 
findings, we might expect perhaps 8 to survive the necessary IVF and CRISPR procedures. Across the 
few GM experiments that have been conducted on human embryos, the reported HDR rate varies 
widely, from around 10% for the initial studies to over 70% for the most recent work; thus it is difficult 
to predict the success rate for Couple X. However, taking a conservative assumption of 25%, this would 
give 2 embryos with the genetic correction. The necessary embryo biopsy testing step would not be 
expected to significantly reduce viability, and ongoing pregnancy rates (after 12 weeks) following 
embryo testing are typically 50-60% for a transferred embryo. Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate that 
Couple X will be able to produce a gene-corrected child within a single ovarian cycle. Repeat attempts 
would also be possible, and would increase the overall chances of success, albeit with Utility costs 
from the burden of IVF cycles. 
If this likelihood of success indeed pertains, what would be the effects on Utility? To answer 
this, it is necessary to compare the levels of Utility likely from alternative courses of action. Because 
PGD is not possible for Couple X (as they are homozygotes), the alternatives will be as follows:
50 See for examples: Acosta, S. et al. Use of two gRNAs for CRISPR/Cas9 improves bi-allelic homologous 
recombination efficiency in mouse embryonic stem cells. Genesis 56; 2018; 56: e23212. Troeder, S.E, et al. An 
optimized electroporation approach for efficient CRISPR/Cas9 genome editing in murine zygotes. PLoS One 13; 
2018; 13: e0196891.
51 Tripronuclear embryos are abnormal and unable to develop into viable foetuses; their use in place of normal 
human embryos avoids some regulatory obstacles and popular ethical concerns.
52 Liang P, Xu Y, Zhang X, et al. (2015). CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human tripronuclear zygotes.
Protein & Cell. 6(5):363-372.
53 Lichun Tang et al. CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human zygotes using Cas9 protein. 
Mol.Genet.Genomics 292; 2017; 292: 525-533.
54 Ma H, Marti-Gutierrez N, Park S, et al. (2017). Correction of a pathogenic gene mutation in human embryos.
Nature. 548(7668):413-419.
55 Because the previously described apparent creation of actual gene-edited human infants by He Jiankui has 
not (at the time of writing) been published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, it is not possible to draw 
conclusions regarding efficacy from his experiment.
































































A. Use donor gametes
B. Use a donor embryo
C. Adopt a child
D. Conceive a child naturally
E. Do not have a child.
In the case of alternative A, either donor sperm would be used to fertilise the female’s oocyte, or a 
donor oocyte would be fertilised with the male partner’s sperm and transferred into the female’s 
reproductive tract. In terms of invasiveness, a GM approach would entail superovulation, oocyte 
recovery, and embryo transfer. Because a donor gamete approach entails fewer invasive steps, it 
should be less burdensome for the mother. In this respect, her Utility level should be higher if a donor 
gamete approach is used instead of GM. However, this could not fulfil the strong desire that Couple X 
have for full genetic relatedness: with AI the child would be related only to the mother, or with a donor 
oocyte, related only to the father. If, given a free choice, the couple prefer the GM approach, this 
demonstrates that they place a higher value on relatedness than they place on the reduced 
burdensomeness of a donor gamete approach. If so, their Utility gain would be greater if they created 
a fully related child via HGGM than if they were denied it and instead reverted to alternative A.56
Alternative B (embryo donation) carries approximately the same degree of invasiveness as A, 
but would be even more problematic in terms Couple X’s desire for relatedness, since the child would 
be related to neither parent. Thus, if the Utility of Couple X would be lower using donor gametes 
versus HGGM, the use of a donor embryo would result in yet lower Utility, insofar as the happiness of 
Couple X is linked to the fulfilment of their desire for a genetically related child. In terms of the Utility 
of the child, the use of any of these techniques –HGGM or the alternatives A or B– should be the same 
in all cases.57 Thus, the personal Utility of Couple X is the factor of key relevance in the Utilitarian 
comparison of these techniques. (And for those who accept the UTV, the addition of an extra life 
would be desirable regardless of which approach was employed.)
The situation is different for alternative C (adoption). If they adopted, Couple X would be 
increasing the Utility of an existing child. To make a Utilitarian comparison of adoption with HGGM, it 
is necessary to consider both the Utility of the parents and that of the child. In the previous section, I 
suggested that, while adoption per se is strongly supported on Utilitarian grounds, the deep desire for 
genetic relatedness held by many prospective parents implies that society ought to establish an 
adoption-enhancing rule preventing access to reproductive technologies. However, if Couple X could 
be consensually persuaded to choose to adopt instead of using HGGM, this would be desirable from 
a Utilitarian perspective. (This applies with the greatest force to the extent that UTV arguments are 
deemed invalid.) However, it seems unlikely that logical persuasion or education of such prospective 
parents about adoption ethics would generally be effective in dislodging strong emotion-based 
motivations to have related children. 
If HGGM is unavailable to Couple X, and they place such value on full genetic relatedness that 
they reject alternatives A-C, their only remaining procreative option is D (natural conception). This 
would produce a child who will develop SCA. While this child may be expected to have an existence 
that is on balance one of positive Utility, SCA will almost certainly substantially reduce their happiness. 
By contrast, a child produced using HGGM should (all else being equal) experience an existence of 
substantially greater happiness. Thus, Utilitarian reasoning leads to the conclusion that it is ethically 
preferable for Couple X to choose the GM approach rather than natural conception. This option would 
also tend to increase the Utility of Couple X, since they will avoid inter alia the emotional anguish that 
56 It is not necessary to posit that Couple X themselves are Utilitarians to draw this conclusion. Indeed, their 
motivation to have a child need not be based on a desire for happiness (of themselves or the child); but the 
effect of allowing them to freely choose their preferred reproductive approach will nevertheless have an effect 
on Utility, which is what counts in the present (Utilitarian) discussion.
57 Here I assume that the parents will not treat their child less well than they would a fully related child.
































































is frequently entailed by parenting a child with a serious disorder. Some would claim that the rigours 
of coping with an ill child ultimately benefits the psyche, making the parent (and possibly the child) a 
‘better person’. This Nietzschean claim that adversity makes us stronger –which is also a common 
feature of several religiously motivated moral perspectives– may have some validity. But from a 
Utilitarian viewpoint, the justification for choosing to knowingly conceive seriously a ill child instead 
of healthy child relies on the suffering of those involved (parents and child) being outweighed by the 
Utility gained through psychologically strengthening. This would pertain where an individual’s 
adversity-improved character leads them to create much good in society. But while this positive 
balance of Utility may arise in the case of a few individuals –whom we might view as moral saints– it 
seems unrealistic to imagine that this could apply more generally. I suggest that for most parents and 
their children the effects of coping with a serious and debilitating lifelong disorder will be a net 
reduction in their Utility, and one that will rarely be balanced by wider Utility-generating benefits.
Suppose Couple X are denied HGGM: if they value genetic relatedness so highly that they 
decline alternatives A-C, and if they decide not to conceive a child who will develop SCA, then 
alternative E (do not have a child) will be the default. This outcome will result in the couple 
experiencing less happiness than had they been able to produce a child through HGGM.58 Therefore, 
on Utilitarian grounds the no-child option is less desirable than the HGGM option. And for those who 
accept the UTV, the non-creation of an additional (healthy) life is ethically undesirable as it entails a 
loss of potential Utility. 
Of course, the above assumptions about success rates might be over-optimistic. The GM 
attempt with Couple X might fail to produce a viable gene-corrected embryo and subsequent child. 
This would have implications in terms of Utility. An IVF cycle is burdensome for the mother, entailing 
inter alia ovarian hyperstimulation and oocyte recovery. Pregnancy itself can be arduous – and a 
failure at this stage can impose a particularly heavy cost, in terms of the emotional impact of 
miscarriage. However, given that PGD is impossible for Couple X, and the only viable disorder-avoiding 
alternatives (donor gametes/embryo or adoption) are unpalatable for them, their decision to attempt 
HGGM could be entirely rational, and compatible with Utilitarian reasoning. Assuming they freely 
consent, having been furnished with an understandable and accurate account of the procedures, likely 
success rates and uncertainties, their decision to proceed represents a rational bet. If the outcome is 
failure, Utility falls; whereas if the attempt is successful, the couple’s happiness should increase 
markedly.
Beyond the benefits to Couple X of a successful attempt, the likely effect of kickstarting a 
HGGM revolution is of substantial societal importance. Once HGGM is in use, it is reasonable to expect 
the technology to improve, rendering it more reliable, efficacious, and cost-effective. In such a future 
world, where advanced GM technology has become widely available, one would expect HGGM to be 
widely used as a disease risk-reducing add-on to conception, as opposed to being employed only in 
cases of monogenic disorder transmission (such as Couple X). Since most prospective parents are not 
at high risk of transmitting a severe, high-penetrance disorder, the availability of HGGM should not 
have a broad impact on procreative decisions; therefore, adoption rates ought not to be substantively 
reduced. Because such a world would contain a reduced amount of genetically influenced disease, 
with no substantial impact on adoption choices amongst these prospective parents, its overall level of 
Utility should be higher than in an equivalent non-GM world.
Thus, because the successful initial use of GM on the human germline is a necessary step in 
the development of more widely applicable HGGM, I conclude that there exists good reason for going 
ahead with the sort of GM attempt suggested for Couple X. Initial HGGM attempts would be on a small 
scale: this is inevitable, given that only a small subset of couples at risk of transmitting a serious genetic 
condition would be candidates for early HGGM. This means that even if a reduction in net Utility arose 
through reduced adoption arising from HGGM in this limited context, it would likely be outweighed 
58 This is not to say that being childless per se is necessarily a position of reduced happiness. See: Rachels, S. 
(2014). The Immorality of Having Children. Ethical Theory Moral. (17)3: 567–82
































































by the Utility-generating effects of bringing forward the development of advanced, widely applicable 
HGGM technology. By contrast, a delay in starting to use HGGM with humans would impose a Utility 
cost, because the time that passes before HGGM starts to yield benefits is time in which extra suffering 
through genetically influenced disease will occur.
OBJECTION TO EARLY-USE HGGM ATTEMPTS
Any proposal to proceed with an early attempt at HGGM (such as that suggested above) would 
undoubtedly be met with a tranche of objections. These would include several well-rehearsed 
positions and arguments, including claims of unnaturalness, the alleged interests of embryos, 
questions of identity, fears of eugenics, and simply the ‘yuck factor’.59 Most of these objections have 
little to do with Utility, and as such carry negligible weight for Utilitarians. However, where Disutility 
is implied by any of these objections, it must be factored into the Utilitarian calculus. One source of 
Disutility would stem from unhappiness experienced by the GM individual regarding their identity, if 
they became distressed over their unnatural manufacture.60 However, this outcome seems rather 
implausible. Similar concerns should apply to IVF as an infertility treatment, yet there exists no good 
evidence that people created through IVF suffer unhappiness through knowing that they were 
produced through an unnatural process.
Another Disutility might be a degree of anxiety or frustration experienced by some bystanders 
in the face of something happening which they consider as morally outrageous.61 A reduction in Utility 
of this sort will of course be experienced mainly by those who have strong cultural or religious 
objections to HGGMs. For the Utilitarian, the question is whether such Disutility would outweigh a 
gain in Utility. A substantive increase in Utility will be expected in the parents who choose to attempt 
HGGM. (Also, bystanders who support HGGM will, to an extent, be made happier by the knowledge 
of a HGGM attempt.) And in terms of the pump-priming effect of early-use HGGM, in a future world 
in which the technology is used to markedly reduce the incidence of disease, there would be 
substantively less suffering than in an alternative non-HGGM world. In sum, the suffering of anti-
HGGM bystanders would be outweighed increased Utility arising from HGGM.
GENETIC HARM
Utilitarians must take seriously the risk of genetic harm that may arise from a HGGM attempt involving 
Couple X. It is of course the GM child who would be at potential risk of any adverse effects from the 
CRISPR technology. Discounting the general risks from routine IVF (which are minimal), the specific 
risks here are twofold: mutations and mosaicism.62 Mutations occur when CRISPR biomolecules 
interact with and alter sequences other than those intended to be modified. This usually involves distal 
parts of the genome (‘off-target’ mutations), but can also affect sequences close to the target locus 
(‘on-target’ mutations). Mosaicism is the generation of an embryo that comprises cells of differing 
genetic constitution: some cells genetically modified, and others not. If a mosaic embryo was used to 
create a person, their body would also comprise a mix of cells. Phenotypically, this might result in a 
child who goes on to manifest some features of the disorder that was to be avoided by the GM. 
59 Philip Ball. The art of medicine Unnatural reactions. Lancet 383; 2014; 383: 1964-1965.
60 Salvi, M. (2001). Shaping individuality: Human inheritable germ line gene modification. Theor Med Bioethics. 
(22)6: 527-542.
61 Hughes, J. (2019). A Defense of Limited Regulation of Human Genetic Therapies. Camb Q Healthc Ethic. 
(28)1: 112-120; Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (2018). Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: Social and 
Ethical Issues. London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
62 Xiao-Hui Zhang et al. Off-target Effects in CRISPR/Cas9-mediated Genome Engineering. Mol.Ther.-Nucl.Acids 
4; 2015; 4: e264, Shuo-Ting Yen et al. Somatic mosaicism and allele complexity induced by CRISPR/Cas9 RNA 
injections in mouse zygotes. Dev.Biol. 393; 2014; 393: 3-9.
































































Additionally, the occurrence of a GM-induced mutation in combination with mosaicism would render 
pre-implantation testing problematic, as there would be a risk that the mutation could be missed 
through analysing only cells that happened not to contain it.
Mutational effects and mosaicism were found to occur at relatively high levels in the early 
days of CRISPR experimentation.63 However, the accuracy of the technology has been rapidly 
improved through extensive work at the in vitro cell and transgenic animal levels, with several recent 
experiments showing extremely low levels of CRISPR-induced mutations64 or mosaicism.65,66 Such 
progress is also reflected in the abovementioned experiments on human embryos. In the first of these 
studies, the researchers randomly selected six of their CRISPR-modified embryos for thorough 
sequencing: of these, off-target mutations were evident in two cases.67 By contrast, in the most recent 
work, all the HDR-corrected GM human embryos obtained were subject to thorough sequencing and 
no CRISPR-associated mutations were found.68 
However, a recent prominent study, authored by Kosiski et al, has suggested that mutational 
damage from CRISPR may arise at a higher rate that hitherto has appeared to be the case.69 This 
research involved GM of various types of mouse and human cells, and discovered that significant on-
target CRISPR-induced mutations had occurred, including large deletions and various complex 
genomic rearrangements. The Kosicki study was published in a reputed journal and the work is of high 
quality: accordingly, it has attracted substantial attention and generated some commentary 
expressing doubts about the potential safety of CRISPR for use with humans.70 But the results obtained 
in the study are of questionable significance in the context of HGGM. The findings are surprising, in 
that very large mutations are described which should have been detected in previous studies that 
have used whole genome sequencing or other powerful methods to detect mutations. There are 
several reasons to suspect that these results may not be representative of CRISPR outcomes in 
general, as follows. Firstly, the work focuses on a form of editing that depends on non-homologous 
end joining (NHEJ); this type of editing is known to be error-prone, and is of less relevance to HGGM 
attempts than provenly reliable approaches, such as those using HDR (as described earlier in this 
paper). Secondly, many of the reported experiments in the study selected for cells that exhibited loss 
of target gene function, potentially skewing the results towards unusual large-scale mutational 
outcomes. Thirdly, the study assayed a narrow range of loci, and these may not be typical of target 
genes in general. Fourthly, most of the reported experiments used a system for delivering the genome 
editing components that itself is known to frequently cause genomic rearrangements; such a delivery 
system would not be appropriate for HGGM. Finally, the cells types used were specialised laboratory 
63 Liang, P, Zhang, X, Chen, Y, et al. (2017). Developmental history and application of CRISPR in human disease. 
J Gene Med. (19)7-7: e2963. Doi: 10.1002/jgm.2963
64 Op. cit. note 24.
65 Mehravar, M, Shirazi, A, Nazari, M, et al. (2019). Mosaicism in CRISPR/Cas9-mediated genome editing. Devel 
Biol. 445(2): 156-162.
66 To some extent mosaicism correlates with off-target mutational activity, in that highly accurate CRISPR 
approaches will only deliver the intended modification, so even if (as with earlier forms of CRISPR technology) 
the biomolecules linger in the embryo beyond the singe-cell stage, they will be less likely to induce additional, 
unwanted genetic changes in subsequent cells.
67 Puping Liang et al. CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human tripronuclear zygotes. Protein & Cell 6; 
2015; 6: 363-372.
68 Ma H, Marti-Gutierrez N, Park S, et al. op. cit. note 48.
69 Kosicki M, Tomberg K, Bradley A. (2018). Repair of double-strand breaks induced by CRISPR-Cas9 leads to 
large deletions and complex rearrangements. Nat Biotechnol. 36(8):765-771.
70 For example see: Wellcome Sanger Institute. (2018). Genome damage from CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing higher 
than thought. Retrieved from https://www.sanger.ac.uk/news/view/genome-damage-crisprcas9-gene-editing-
higher-thought; and Brackley, P. (2018). Wellcome Sanger Institute scientists warn CRISPR/Cas 9 gene editing 
could lead to 'harmful effects'. Retrieved from https://www.cambridgeindependent.co.uk/business/wellcome-
sanger-institute-scientists-warn-crispr-cas-9-gene-editing-could-lead-to-harmful-effects-9051009/ 
































































strains, which probably have different cellular DNA repair process than exist in actual human embryos, 
and there is good reason to expect that some of these cell types will be particularly prone to 
mutational errors during editing.
While the Kosicki paper should not be ignored, there is good reason to believe that the low or 
zero occurrences of mutations and clinically relevant mosaicism reported in most of the recent 
literature would likely apply to a well-conceived, real-life attempt at HGGM. It does appear to be the 
case that mosaicism occurred in the He Jiankui HGGM experiment. However, as described above, He 
appears to have been operating as a rogue scientist, and his work can hardly be said to have been well 
conceived. The He case points towards the need for HGGM to only be conducted under well-regulated 
environments by competent individuals. Most importantly, any ethically acceptable HGGM attempt 
would incorporate appropriate genetic testing prior to the generation of GM child. This would include 
preliminary testing work carried out using cells from the prospective parents71, to equilibrate the 
CRISPR and template molecules and to assay for mutational effects (as was conducted as part of the 
above-mentioned 2017 human embryo study). Subsequent to such testing, embryos would be 
screened using PGD coupled with deep sequencing to reveal any mutational issues, such that mutated 
embryos can be rejected.
It would in any case be wrong to assume that a mutation in the child’s genome would 
inevitably have an effect on their health. It is well established that only around 2% of the human 
genome comprises protein-coding genes and their linked control elements. This implies that any single 
random mutation would have an approximate likelihood of 1 in 50 of occurring within one of these 
crucial regions. However, this figure of ca. 2% does not include various genomic elements that express 
non-coding RNA molecules hitherto considered functionless, but for which evidence is accumulating 
of a role in ‘fine tuning’ gene expression and thus potentially influencing phenotype.72 But theoretical 
considerations suggest that the functional fraction of the human genome cannot exceed 25%, and is 
almost certainly considerably lower.73 Recent studies indicate that the non-coding functional regions 
account for around 6% of the genome, meaning that (in combination with the 2% above) the total 
‘target’ for a potentially damaging mutation is around 8% of the genome.74 This suggests that a single 
CRISPR-induced mutation would have only around a 1 in 12 likelihood of occurring in a functionally 
significant part of the genome.
Even where an individual mutation has occurred in the functionally important 8% of the 
genome, and has somehow escaped detection such that it is present in the GM child, in many or most 
cases there will be no adverse phenotypic effects. This is most likely in the case of the proportion of 
the genome that expresses non-coding RNA sequences with a functional role. In general, these non-
coding RNAs appear to exert only a modest effect on gene expression and, importantly in the context 
of mutagenesis, their functionality in general does not depend on the high levels of sequence precision 
that pertains to the ca. 2% of the genome that comprises protein coding and other vital sequences.75 
In keeping with this model of low criticality, while association studies have linked these regions with 
disease, in general they appear to act as risk factors (as opposed to disease determinants), each having 
71 Skin fibroblast-derived stem cells would be likely candidates. They were used in the 2017 human embryo 
study.
72 Mattick JS. (2004). RNA regulation: A new genetics? Nature Reviews Genetics. 5(4):316-323.
RNA regulation: a new genetics?
73 Graur D. (2017). An upper limit on the functional fraction of the human genome. Genome Biology and 
Evolution. 9(7):1880-1885.
74 Wang J, Samuels DC, Zhao S, Xiang Y, Zhao Y, Guo Y. (2017). Current research on non-coding ribonucleic acid 
(RNA). Genes. 8(12).
75 Patil VS, Zhou R, Rana TM. (2014). Gene regulation by non-coding RNAs. Crit Rev Biochem Mol Biol. 49(1):16-
32.; Sheng L, Ye L, Zhang D, Cawthorn WP, Xu B. (2018). New insights into the long non-coding RNA SRA: 
Physiological functions and mechanisms of action. Frontiers in Medicine. 5:244.
































































a limited contribution to the disease phenotype.76 Thus, a CRISPR-induced mutation that alters one of 
these non-coding elements is unlikely to lead to the child manifesting a genetic disorder. 
Even mutations in coding sequence can be functionally silent; for example, affecting part of a 
sequence in a way which does not change the amino acid constitution of the gene product, or changing 
it in an insignificant way. Of mutations that do have a negative effect on the gene product or its 
expression, not all will lead to a genetic disorder; for example, a mutation that knocks-out a crucial 
developmental gene may result in a non-viable embryo (and thus not give rise to a foetus or child), 
and some mutations that knock-out gene function will be compensated for by haplosufficiency77. 
From the above scientific considerations, it seems clear that a well-conceived HGGM attempt, 
such as that suggested for Couple X, is very unlikely to lead to a genetic disorder in the GM child. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that HGGM using current technology would be absolutely risk-free. 
The question is, are the risks sufficiently low such that it is ethically acceptable to proceed with early 
use GM?
RISKS IN CONTEXT
We are faced with a chicken-and-egg dilemma: the real risk rates for CRISPR-based HGGM cannot be 
determined until a number of children have been produced using this technology. Thus, if human GM 
were deemed permissible only once direct proof of an acceptably low risk is available, then it could 
never be permitted. While many opponents of human GM would no doubt support this position, 
Utilitarians have reason to think otherwise, considering the potential benefits to humanity that are 
likely to ultimately flow from HGGM.
It is true that an accidental CRISPR-induced mutation could lead to a negative outcome for the 
health of the child. However, natural reproduction itself is by no means free from mutational risks. 
Genetic sequencing has been used in a number of recent studies to analyse genetic differences 
between trios of individual parents and their (naturally conceived) offspring, and the results obtained 
so far indicate that natural de novo mutations affect the germline at a rate of approximately 70 de 
novo mutations per generation.78 This means that each individual is, on average, expected to harbour 
around 70 genetic mutations that were not present in either of their parents’ genomes, which have 
arisen in the gametes or conceptus from which the individual developed. Most of these de novo 
mutations do not cause disease, for the reasons given above. Nevertheless, the risk of genetic disease 
is positively correlated with the number of mutations in the genome. In epidemiological terms, ca. 1% 
of neonates suffer from a clinically important monogenic defect, and a further ca. 2% suffer from a 
congenital malformation, with a substantial proportion of these problems likely being the result of de 
novo mutations. And several studies have confirmed that the total number of mutations increases 
76 Jain S, Thakkar N, Chhatai J, Bhadra MP, Bhadra U. (2018). Long non-coding RNA: Functional agent for 
disease traits. Rna Biology. (2017). 14(5):522-535; Gomez-Verjan JC, Vazquez-Martinez ER, Rivero-Segura NA, 
Medina-Campos RH. The RNA world of human ageing. Hum Genet. 137(11-12):865-879.
77 Haplosufficiency occurs where a single copy of a gene is sufficient for normal functioning; since most genes 
are present in the genome as two copies (one from each parent), in many cases the functional knockout of one 
copy does not lead to a negative effect on health. Not all genes, however, display haplosufficiency; for 
example, two functional copies of certain genes are often required for normal development. And in an 
individual’s genome, there will be genes where only one copy is functional; if the remaining functional copy is 
knocked out, all function of that gene will be lost. 
78 This value is necessarily approximate, because the field is relatively new and to date the numbers of family 
trios that have been thoroughly sequenced is quite low. For reports of trio-sequencing studies, see: Hakon 
Jonsson et al. Parental influence on human germline de novo mutations in 1,548 trios from Iceland. Nature 
549; 2017; 549: 519-+, Ziyue Gao et al. Interpreting the Dependence of Mutation Rates on Age and Time. Plos 
Biology 14; 2016; 14: e1002355, Laurent C. Francioli et al. Genome-wide patterns and properties of de novo 
mutations in humans. Nat.Genet. 47; 2015; 47: 822. 
































































with parental age, with children from older parents (particularly fathers) on average harbouring a 
greater number of mutations.79
This background of de novo mutations provides some perspective from which to view the risk 
of mutations from CRISPR-mediated HGGM affecting the genome of a child from Couple X. Of the 
many new germline mutations that unavoidably arise in the genome of all humans, the majority do 
not lead to genetic disorders, and thus each such mutation might reasonably be viewed as, on average, 
contributing an insignificant risk. On this view, the small additional risk from CRISPR ought also to be 
viewed as insignificant. However, it does not follow from ‘we tolerate risk X’ to ‘we should tolerate 
risk X+n, where n is smaller than X’. To think otherwise may amount to a context illusion – namely a 
failure to acknowledge a small potential source of Disutility when it is set in the context of a much 
larger background of the same.80 It follows that, if the increased risk is to be accepted, it must be worth 
the anticipated benefits. As discussed above, early HGGM attempts such as that suggested for 
hypothetical Couple X would be likely to deliver substantive Utility-promoting benefits, including 
fulfilment of their strong desire to have a genetically related child, and the avoidance of instead 
creating a non-GM child who will develop SCA. Although it is possible that this gain of Utility might be 
outweighed by Disutility through discouragement of adoption, the broader effect of promoting the 
development of more advanced GM technologies with wide future applicability amounts to a 
substantial Utility boost. The wider future use of HGGM to reduce the incidence of common 
genetically influenced diseases would almost certainly outweigh the small additional mutational risk 
associated with current CRISPR technology. Additionally, it is likely that when the HGGM revolution is 
underway, future technical refinements and advances will be forthcoming that will further reduce the 
rate of GM-induced accidental mutations.
CONSENT AND HARM
Another potential objection to the proposed HGGM attempt is that the future child cannot consent 
to the procedure. In other words, the use of GM would violate the autonomy of the child, because 
the child must bear the risk of a mutational accident without having a say in the matter. Utilitarians 
have good reason to respect the principle of autonomy,81 and therefore must take the lack-of-
consent charge seriously. However, a principled objection to GM on grounds of autonomy would 
also entail the rejection of all pre-conception interventions, including IVF and PGD. This conclusion is 
not viable for Utilitarians, since established technologies such as these clearly lead to beneficial 
outcomes, and there is no evidence that lack of consent for prenatal interventions has a negative 
effect on the happiness of the child. More fundamentally, it is not conceptually possible for a lack of 
consent to cause Disutility, since prenatal consent is impossible. Children cannot consent to being 
conceived, nor to their genetic constitution, nor to the societal circumstances into which they will be 
born. Therefore, a strict principle of consent would entail that procreation in general be considered 
unethical.82 This anti-natalist position is manifestly untenable on Utilitarian grounds, because the 
79 Simon L. Girard et al. Paternal Age Explains a Major Portion of De Novo Germline Mutation Rate Variability in 
Healthy Individuals. PLoS One 11; 2016; 11: e0164212, Kevin R. Smith. Paternal age bioethics. J.Med.Ethics 41; 
2015; 41: 775-779.
80 Glover J, Scott-Taggart MJ. (1975). It makes no difference whether or not I do it. Proc Aristotelian Soc. 
49:171-209.
81 Although autonomy frequently functions in ethical discourse as a deontological principle, it is also derivable 
from Utilitarian considerations. In the long run it would be detrimental to the general wellbeing if the 
autonomy of individuals were to be routinely disregarded; thus, autonomy serves as a Utility-maximiser and is 
therefore respected by Utilitarians, albeit not as an absolutely inviolable principle.
82 Robert Ranisch. Germline Genome Editing and the Functions of Consent. American Journal of Bioethics 17; 
2017; 17: 27-29.
































































application of such a restrictive principle would manifestly reduce Utility.83 By contrast, a policy 
based on proxy consent (given by the parents), will increase Utility and thus should be considered 
ethically appropriate for HGGM, just as it is for established reproductive technologies.
From a Utilitarian perspective, the key issue here is not consent; rather, it is whether the risk 
of harm outweighs the likely benefits to the future child. If Couple X decide that they must have a 
child (i.e. non-parenthood is unacceptable to them) and that the child must be fully genetically 
related to both parents (i.e. they will not accept adoption, donor gametes or a donor embryo), the 
only family-founding options are:
A. Undergo CRISPR-mediated GM
-or-
B. Conceive a child naturally.
Option A will (if a viable modified embryo is obtained, and testing shows that the genetic correction 
has occurred) produce a child who does not develop SCA, but who is at some (albeit low) risk of 
sustaining a CRISPR-induced unintended mutation, which might impact on the child’s health. By 
contrast, option B will produce a child who is virtually certainly to develop SCA. Confronted with only 
these two options, Utilitarian reasoning leads to the conclusion that, because outcome A is 
preferable to outcome B, it is ethically preferable for Couple X to choose to undergo CRISPR-
mediated GM.
If Couple X choose to knowingly conceive a child who will develop a serious disorder when 
they could have produced a child who will not develop the disorder, have they harmed the child? 
Most Utilitarians accept the notion of ‘impersonal harm’, in the sense that a procreative choice that 
knowingly would create a child who will experiences a life of reduced happiness is an act that causes 
harm, despite no existing person being harmed when the procreative decision was made.84 If a 
procreative decision is likely to produce a child whose life would not be worth living (i.e. containing 
more suffering than happiness), then Utilitarians have good reason to view such a child as having 
been harmed, and indeed wronged, by the decision to proceed. On this view, non-existence (i.e. the 
no-child option) would be preferable to such a life. Suppose, instead, that a procreative decision will 
produce a child whose life would be of reduced happiness but would contain more happiness than 
suffering. Has harm occurred? If an alternative procreative choice was available that would instead 
have produced a child who would be expected not to have a life of reduced happiness, it follows that 
(impersonal) harm has indeed resulted. Accordingly, from a Utilitarian perspective it would be wrong 
to choose to create a child of reduced happiness where an alternative was available.85
83 Many will feel instinctively that this anti-natalist position is wrong and reject it on this intuitive basis; it can 
also be argued that the position amounts to a reductio ad absurdum and accordingly ought to be rejected. 
Utilitarian logic reaches the same conclusion –that the anti-natalist position ought to be rejected– but for 
different reasons, as follows. Disutility would flow both from a direct reduction in the happiness of prospective 
parents (because they are prevented from fulfilling their desire to procreate), and more broadly through 
entailing an authoritarian restriction of autonomy, which would be inimical to the sort of free society that is 
considered by most Utilitarians to be conducive to greater Utility compared with repressive societies. 
Additionally, the inevitable reduction in the population that would follow from application of the anti-natalist 
position would be rejected by those who ascribe to a UTV, given the concomitant loss of Utility through a lack 
of creation of future people.
84 Nicola J. Williams and John Harris. What is the harm in harmful conception? On threshold harms in non-
identity cases. Theor.Med.Bioeth. 35; 2014; 35: 337-351.
85 The reduction in happiness would have to be substantial. This is so in light of the imprecision inherent in 
evaluating the qualities of different lives (see: Parfit, D, op. cit. note 37). Additionally, a very small reduction in 
the Utility of the child might be outweighed by gains in Utility elsewhere, such as the mother avoiding Disutility 
arising from the burdens associated with assisted conception.
































































In the case of Couple X, a decision to conceive naturally would, by creating a child with SCA, 
result either in a life not worth living or –more likely in the particular case of SCA– a life of 
substantially reduced happiness. By contrast, HGGM would avoid SCA while imposing a small risk of 
producing a child with a CRISP-induced genetic disorder. In this specific scenario, i.e. where other 
reproductive options have been ruled out, HGGM would be the ethically preferable choice.
As discussed above, on the assumption that the UTV is invalid, it might be preferable if those 
in the same (or equivalent) genetic position as Couple X were to choose adoption instead of HGGM, 
since this would most likely generate the greatest amount of Utility. However, to the extent that 
some of these couples would decline adoption due to possessing a strong desire for relatedness, 
enabling access to HGGM would –despite the (likely very small) risks entailed by current GM 
technology– result in increased Utility through a reduction in the level of harm that would otherwise 
accrue when some of these couples chose to conceive naturally. While making the technology 
available would likely deter some couples from choosing adoption, it would also have the effect of 
kickstarting the HGGM revolution. This would move us closer to a World in which overall Utility 
would be substantially elevated due to reduced levels of genetically influenced disease. 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
As discussed above, while the likelihood of harm appears to be low for a first-attempt at HGGM using 
current technology, the possibility of catastrophic mutational accidents cannot be ruled out, although 
it is impossible to accurately quantify the actual level of risk until several HGGM attempts have been 
conducted. For Utilitarians, the presence of some risk should not in itself be an obstacle to the pursuit 
of HGGM. Nevertheless, opponents of GM often present risk –especially unknown risk– as grounds 
for absolute proscription. In this context, the ‘precautionary principle’ (PP) is frequently deployed, 
explicitly or implicitly, against proposals to develop or deploy new genetic technologies, including 
HGGM.86
The PP is intuitively attractive to many, as it appeals to the deep human heuristic favouring 
caution. However, the PP implies unacceptably negative, or even absurd, consequences. The strongest 
version of the PP holds any degree of risk to be unacceptable, irrespective of the potential benefits. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to do anything innovative in bioscience or medicine without some risk, 
or that could eventually lead to undesirable outcomes.87 Various attenuated forms of the PP have 
been proposed, which seek to avoid the absurd implications of the strong PP.88 However, such variants 
inject nonconsequentialist elements – such as the allocation of capriciously high weightings to certain 
types of risk, for example ‘severe’ or ‘unknown’ risks– into the assessment of risk versus benefit. 
Utilitarians are bound to reject such intrusions, as they can only lead to a skewing of the Utilitarian 
calculus and a concomitant bias towards prohibition.
Another PP-based objection against proceeding with a germline GM attempt focuses not on 
risks to the immediate children who may be created with the initial attempts at germline GM, but with 
86 Smith, KR, et al. Human germline GM: scientific and bioethical perspectives. Arch.Med.Res. 43; 2012; 43: 
491-513.
87 For example, a number of patients have died or become seriously ill due to unexpected effects of virus-
based agents used in somatic gene therapy clinical trials. If the strong PP had been applied in the domain of 
somatic gene therapy, the accidental deaths and morbidity would have been avoided, but this would have 
been to the detriment of the growing number of patients that have benefitted from somatic gene therapy 
technology to date, and would have excluded any benefits to the future patients that will be treated in 
increasing numbers as the technology advances. So the PP in its strongest form, if applied, would permit 
nothing to be done at all!
88 A. Arcuri. (2007). Reconstructing precaution, deconstructing misconceptions. Ethics Int Aff 21: 359-379; 
Sandin, P. (1999.) Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 5(5): 889-
907. Harris J, Holm S. (2002). Extending human lifespan and the precautionary paradox. J Med Philos. 
27(3):355-368; C. Sunstein. Beyond the precautionary principle. U Penn Law Rev (2003). 151: 1003-1058.
































































the spectre of distant harms or other negative outcomes. On this view, a ‘slippery-slope’ is perceived 
that would lead inexorably from an early-use to a dystopian situation, with the corollary that is would 
be unethical to ever attempt germline GM, lest it lead to such eventual disaster. While the general 
concept of a slippery slope is intuitively attractive to many laypeople and media commentators, it is 
supported by few ethicists.89 This is because the concept lacks a logical basis: why should the first use 
of any novel biomedical technology inexorably lead to disaster? I suggest that, to qualify as a coherent 
argument, the onus resides with the proponents of a slippery-slope to establish a plausible and strong 
link between the early-use of a new technology and the evoked dystopian future.
Of course, possible future Utility-reducing downsides of widespread HGGM can be envisioned, 
including negative societal effects through genetic inequity, opportunity costs through diversion of 
resources from alternative projects, and a narrowing of the human gene pool when the technology 
becomes able to alter large numbers of sequences per embryo. And it has been argued that, just as a 
slippery slope is a fallacious assumption, it would be unwarranted to assume the existence of a 
simplistic ‘automatic escalator’ in which technological improvement leads to some utopia.90 However, 
history demonstrates that progress in medical science and technology has indubitably produced major 
net benefits for humanity; and there is every reason to believe that further major gains will accrue, 
commensurate to the extent that bioscientific research is allowed to proceed.91 The posited 
downsides lie far in the future; their probability and magnitude is highly uncertain, and technological 
or legislative solutions may well emerge to prevent or mitigate them. To proscribe a promising 
biotechnological development in its initial stages based on possible far-future downsides would be 
irrational and unconducive to Utility maximisation.
A PRUDENTIAL UTILITARIAN APPROACH
In the farther future, HGGM is likely to become highly effective and efficient: it is conceivable that it 
might ultimately be applied to large numbers of people, perhaps in a manner akin to present day 
immunisation programmes, thereby preventing millions of premature deaths and a great deal of 
suffering. We cannot know whether the necessary technological developments to reach this stage will 
take 15, 50, or 100 years, or more: but it is clear that a delay to the start of this journey would postpone 
the future benefits. If we wait for (say) 10 years before proceeding, that will be 10 years lost, which 
equates to a substantial forfeiture of Utility. Of course, the people who stand to benefit the most from 
HGGM do not yet exist; but the happiness of these future people must be included in the Utilitarian 
calculus.
Thus, a delay in implementing the technology would be a source of Disutility. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that it must be right to permit HGGM immediately, without any delay 
89 Spielthenner G. (2010). A logical analysis of slippery slope arguments. Health Care Anal. 18(2):148-163.
90 S. Holm and T. Takala. High hopes and automatic escalators: a critique of some new arguments in bioethics. J 
Med Ethics 33; 2007; 33: 1-4.
91 Pace Holm and Takala (ibid), there is good reason to think that a trend towards Utility-boosting technical 
improvement does exist in the context of biomedicine. This notion is supported on a theoretical level: because 
governments sponsor the development of biomedical technology with the aim of providing benefits to society, 
and the products of biotechnology have a market value (and are thus sustained and further developed) 
because of the benefits they bring, we might reasonably expect these factors to provide impetus to the 
improvement of these technologies, thus increasingly yielding Utility. And in practice, the history of biomedical 
technology has been one of steady improvement from small beginnings, bringing forth a myriad of invaluable 
innovations: a full list of these technological accomplishments would be very long, ranging from antibiotics to 
dialysis machines to synthetic insulin, to name but a few areas in which small scientific beginnings have led to 
major Utility-promoting outcomes. This general history of progress in the domain of medical technology gives 
reason to be optimistic in regards to HGGM: it appears highly likely that the development and deployment of 
human HGGM, kickstarted by an early-use attempt such as that with Couple X, will yield substantial Utility-
generating benefits in terms of reducing the burden of genetically influenced disease.
































































whatsoever. An alternative approach would be to wait a modest period –perhaps one or two years– 
to allow the underlying technology to mature further. This delay would entail some Utility loss, 
because some couples would have more difficulty conceiving later, and some would opt for natural 
conception in the meantime. But it would also bring several advantages. Efficacy and precision will 
likely further improve as the basic technology is refined, meaning that the risks of both failure (and 
the associated burden of IVF cycles) and genetic damage (and associated disease) should be reduced.
While these benefits from a delay would boost Utility, the magnitude of the Utility gain will 
be low, considering that (as discussed above) current CRISPR technology already offers the ability to 
reliably alter genetic sequences with relatively low levels of genetic damage. Additionally, a delay that 
appeared to be based on acceding to the notion that the technology is insufficiently safe might 
inadvertently lend support to arguments for an indefinite delay, since it will never be possible to know 
with certainty what the actual safety levels are until the technology is used to create human children. 
However, a modest delay might offer the pragmatic benefit of allowing public trust to build. If more 
cellular and in vivo (animal) reports of success are allowed to accumulate, and thus counter residual 
safety concerns (such as the above-mentioned negative report of Kosicki et al), this may serve to 
provide reassurance to the public, thereby creating greater acceptance for HGGM. 
The recent news that He Jiankui has seemingly created gene-edited human infants is of 
particular relevance to the question of a delay. As discussed above, this apparent first-attempt at 
HGGM looks ill-conceived and early indications are that it has not been fully successful; it thus is likely 
to function as a setback for the start of the HGGM revolution.92 If another attempt, such as that 
suggested for Couple X, were also to fail badly, it seems likely that public support for the whole 
enterprise would be severely impacted, leading to long delays in going forward with HGGM. Thus, 
although it can be argued that a properly conceived GM attempt, such as that described for the Couple 
X scenario, might justifiably proceed straightaway, the bad publicity surrounding the first actual 
attempt at HGGM gives further support to the argument that Utilitarians should support a modest 
delay, of perhaps one or two years, before moving ahead with further attempts to modify the human 
germline.
CONCLUSIONS
A permanent or long-term prohibition on the use of GM technology would be antithetical to progress 
in biomedical innovation, and hence unethical. Although there exist residual safety concerns about 
CRISPR, there are strong grounds to believe that the technology could be used to create a GM child at 
an acceptable level of risk. It is possible to identify plausible cases where the application of HGGM 
technology, at its current stage of technical development, would bring about direct beneficial 
consequences for those concerned. Couple X in the foregoing discussion represents a hypothetical 
candidate case, involving SCA. A successful CRISPR-based HGGM attempt would, despite the burden 
of the process on the mother, boost Utility in respect of these parents, and their future child, if the 
child would otherwise have been conceived naturally and thus destined to develop SCA. However, the 
availability of HGGM may lead to some parents choosing this approach instead of adopting a child, 
which would be a Disutility since the happiness of orphaned children can be greatly increased through 
adoption. But a successful early-use attempt would have the wider benefit of serving to kickstart the 
92 It is instructive to compare this first attempt at HGGM with the pioneering attempt at human IVF in the 
1970s. The two experiments have in common a number of ethically questionable features, in particular a 
failure to publicise or consult in advance. However, the IVF attempt was in the event entirely successful, 
leading to the birth of a healthy individual; by contrast, the GM experiment appears to have failed in certain 
respects. Speculatively, had the GM attempt been indubitably successful, its ethically problematic features (i.e. 
issues of justification, approval and consent) might have been largely ignored, and the ensuing commentary 
less condemnatory, in the same way that ethically questionable aspects of the IVF experiment were eclipsed 
by its manifest success.
































































whole enterprise of HGGM. This means that even if there was an initial net reduction in Utility due to 
reduced adoption associated with the early use of GM, it would most probably be outweighed by the 
Utility-generating effects of bringing forward the development of advanced, widely applicable HGGM 
technology. From a Utilitarian perspective, no principled reasons exist to support a risk-averse 
‘precautionary’ delay on an early-use HGGM attempt. However, a modest delay would have pragmatic 
benefits, a notion that has been given added impetus by the recent news of an ethically questionable 
and apparently not entirely successful first attempt at HGGM. I suggest that Utility will be maximised 
if we kickstart the next biomedical revolution by proceeding not immediately but within around 1-2 
years to intervene in the human germline.

































































Comments from Editors and Reviewer My responses
COMMENTS FROM THE EDITORS
Revise again, addressing (the reviewer’s) comments and reducing the paper by 
around 20%.
I have revised the paper according to the Reviewer’s comments, as set out 
below. In so doing I have reduced the overall length. According to Word, this is 
now (excluding abstract etc) c.11k words (11,059 to be precise), meaning a 
reduction of c.3,000 words, from the original c.14k – i.e. a reduction of slightly 
over 20%.
REVIEWER’S COMMENTS
Overall comments: The utilitarian analysis is much improved, from a 
philosophical point of view, by the latest revision. This comes at a serious cost, 
however, that the length has ballooned out to over 14,000 words – a short 
treatise. Long-form bioethics articles are not inherently problematic, but there is 
a danger that the paper will meander, and the central important thrust be lost. 
Long-form is better suited towards big-picture analyses of larger issues. This 
article, however, is more tightly focused around a specific argument: that a 
utilitarian risk-benefit analysis militates in favour of germline gene modification, 
if not immediately, within the next few years.
The result is a paper that is alternatively fascinating and frustrating, as one must 
wade through a good amount of extraneous material to get to the core 
argument. That core argument is very important, however, and is in some ways 
particularly novel, at least at this moment in history – I do not know of any 
bioethicist post-He Jiankui who is defending the sort of position put forward 
here (George Church notwithstanding), and it is very much a position that should 
be debated seriously, even if one is strongly opposed to germline modification 
within the next three years. The author may want the bulwark of the incredibly 
detailed argument to shield themselves from inevitable strong critique if and 
when this is published. But often those arguments are not freestanding anyway – 
relying on more thorough literature elsewhere (e.g., the Parfitian analysis of 
utilitarianism; the problems of the precautionary principle; the techno-optimism 
that underpins the central argument).
I am, once again, most grateful to the reviewer for their detailed and insightful 
comments. I have endeavoured to address the spirit of the overall comment, 
as well as the specific major and minor comments. I have fully accepted the 
vast majority of the reviewer’s points and suggestions, and amended the paper 
accordingly, as set out below.

































































The paper is then strong on its merits, but tedious to read. Beyond the specific 
comments below (none of which are any barrier to publication), I would urge the 
author to consider points where the argument can be substantially streamlined, 
and parts cut altogether. It can be a very difficult thing to cut down work that 
one has toiled over so greatly, but the words of Antoine de Saint-Exupery are 
relevant here: Perfection is achieved, not when there is nothing left to add, but 
when there is nothing left to take away.
MAJOR COMMENTS
1)      It’s good that the author brings up the historic birth of the first gene-edited 
babies. I think this should be brought up even earlier, in the introduction – it will be on 
every reader’s minds, and the author should clarify from the outset the relevance of 
what they have to say to that case.
I have brought the description into the Intro section, and modified the 
discursive elements in situ.
2)      P. 2: The note in the middle paragraph about applicability goes a long way 
towards making the paper interesting to non-utilitarians. Though, on reading this new 
version, it occurs to me that the paper is essentially an analysis of whether germline 
editing has a favourable risk-benefit ratio – something central to much clinical/research 
ethics work. Maybe worth mentioning?
I have added a short preceding paragraph to convey this.
3)      P. 3: It should be explained why germline editing is not a therapy. Is it because 
therapies apply only to people, and embryos are not people? Or that editing creates a 
new person? Or that it’s inextricably bound up in the act of creation?
This is a very good point. Though to do justice to it would be to open another 
avenue for detailed discussion, around issues of personal identity. Accordingly, 
I have altered the wording to clarify the issue, without going into lengthy 
details, and demoted it to a footnote. 
4)      P. 7: “Utilitarians have good reason to support attempting GM in place of PGD on 
the basis that it would bring about an important wider benefit, namely the kickstarting 
of a revolution in germline GM.” Why is that such a wider benefit? If in the great 
majority of cases, PGD is superior to GM, then the benefit would only accrue in a 
smaller set of cases. Presumably, that benefit relates to rare dual monogenic carriers, 
polygenic editing and/or enhancement applications. In that case, why not limit trials to 
those types of cases?
I have amended this to make explicit the broader benefits. In so doing I have 
emphasised that the wider applications will only be possible once the basic 
technology starts being used, thus clarifying that limiting GM to those cases is 
not yet feasible. 
5)      P. 7: “parental informed consent for germline GM would seem unlikely to be 
obtainable in such cases.” Parental consent itself doesn’t seem likely to be an obstacle 
– I’m sure you could find gung-ho transhumanist volunteers if you really wanted. If the 
obstacle is instead that the studies aren’t ethically justified because the risks outweigh 
the benefits, just say that. But given your commitments in this paper, I suspect the real 
problem is that earliest trials are the riskiest, and therefore should focus on targets of 
the greatest possible benefit.
On reflection, I realise that this is correct: such volunteers would indeed be 
there. I have adjusted for this by removing the claim, and leading into the next 
paragraph with the word ‘moreover’ (cf. ‘nevertheless’). This also sits well with 
the amendment to the previous tract (as above).

































































6)      P. 11: “While Utilitarians have reason to support radical changes to laws where 
the outcome is increased Utility, in practice a move to prevent access to established 
reproductive technologies (in order to boost adoption) would simply be rejected in an 
open society.” I found this line of argument confusing, and somewhat undermining of 
the whole paper. If democratic processes trump sound utilitarian reasoning, why 
bother with this 14,000 word paper at all? We should just go by the popular will. (and 
indeed, popular will would likely in most contexts reject a thoroughgoing utilitarian 
framework like that offered in this paper) Presumably, the reply is that this paper is 
meant (within a democratic context) be part of a conversation over whether and how 
to regulate GM. In that case, popular rejection of a proposal should not be a reason 
against the author endorsing that proposal. The logical conclusion of one strand of 
utilitarian logic (banning IVF) should be put forward honestly. 
It is good that the reviewer has highlighted my lack of clarity here. My 
intention was not to imply that democratic process trump Utilitarian 
reasoning. A more thorough discussion around this -not to mention a 
discussion of IVF ethics per se- would need many more words to do the issues 
justice, which would be untenable given the need to reduce length. Thus, after 
reflection, I have simply removed the problematic paragraph. 
7)      P. 15, paragraph beginning “However, the effect of…”: Just as with the preceding 
paragraph, there is not nearly enough evidence to support with confidence the claim 
that advancing GM will overall lead to more utility. Great uncertainties include the 
effect on society (cf genetic inequity objections), opportunity cost (money diverted 
from higher-utility projects), unknown genetic effects (see, e.g., possible negative effect 
of CCR5 on lifespand only recently highlighted), feasibility of polygenic editing (and 
uncertainty over the balance of tradeoffs when *massive* numbers of genes are 
edited), etc.
These are real concerns, but they are far-future; to see such uncertain possible 
downsides as reason to stop nascent GM is a form of slippery slope argument. 
So, I have not retreated from the broad thrust of my argument here, however I 
have made substantial alterations and added a new paragraph, plus footnotes, 
to clarify my position and deal with this objection.
8)      P. 16: Invocation of the Harm Principle seems out of place. While Mill was of 
course a utilitarian, the Harm Principle does not itself follow straightforwardly from 
utilitarianism – it relies on a series of other political assumptions that the author has 
not defended or endorsed. Moreover, the author doesn’t appear to even be deploying 
the Harm Principle in this very paragraph, when they say: “To do so would be to cause 
more harm than good, because biomedical innovation which is substantially in the 
public interest would be stifled in a society that sought to prevent bystander distress by 
proscribing the use of such technology.” This does not appeal to any categorical 
political prohibition on paternalistic intervention. Nor is the author only arguing 
*prevention of harm* is the only legitimate goal of the state. Rather, they are simply 
making a cost-benefit analysis. If the tech were actually weak in benefit, and people 
*really* opposed to it (reproductive cloning is a good candidate here), the author’s 
logic would militate in favour of a ban, pace Mill.
On reflection, I agree, and have excised this paragraph. The preceding 
paragraph covers the direct effects on Utility, and that does enough, without 
the complication of Millian ‘harm’.
9)      P. 24: “it is reasonable to expect that governments will act to prevent manifestly 
damaging uses of the technology.” This doesn’t seem a reasonable assumption at all. 
As part of reducing the length of the paper, much of the PP material has been 
cut, and what remains reworked. This includes the assumption highlighted by 
this review point. 


































































1)      P. 2: The paragraph on Kantians, virtue ethicists, pluralists, etc. could do with a 
few more citations. In particular, a representative principlist account (Beauchamp and 
Childress) and casuist take (Albert Jonsen’s work?) could be cited.
Added.
2)      Also, it’s probably best to avoid strong claims like “a majority” without evidence; 
“many” will do.
Changed.
3)      P. 2: I understand the paragraph about utilitarianism not being monolithic was put 
in in response to the editor’s comments. Still, I think this paragraph doesn’t add much – 
the paragraph that follows, on varieties of utilitarianism, demonstrates heterogeneity 
more directly. And it goes without saying that any argument for X based on Y theory 
doesn’t speak for all holders of Y theory.
I agree, and have removed this paragraph; but to also try to satisfy the initial 
editorial comment, I have placed it as a footnote.
4)      Pp. 2-3: Preference satisfaction isn’t a form of indirect utilitarianism. Rather, it’s 
an account of the nature of utility – that utility just consists in satisfying preferences. 
Rule utilitarianism, by contrast (also mentioned in the same sentence), is indeed solidly 
a form of indirect utilitarianism.
I don’t quite agree. While in most cases preference satisfaction will enhance 
Utility, satisfying an individual’s preference does not necessarily lead to greater 
personal Utility. For example, the individual may be mistaken about the likely 
benefits of a given choice, or may not have adequate self-knowledge to 
accurately judge the effects on their Utility of a given choice. Hence I have not 
changed the wording.
5)      P. 3: It would be helpful to very briefly explain why hedonistic utilitarianism is 
chosen. Is it just easier to adjudicate than other forms, i.e., a pragmatic choice?
I have added a footnote with an explanation.
6)      P. 3: The use of the term ‘proband’ will be confusing to non-geneticist readers, 
and in any case I’m not sure it’s the accurate term for the subject of gene editing.
I have substituted alternative phrasings in the 4 instances of this word 
(different wordings in each case, specific to the context). 
7)      P. 4: Citations are needed in relation to the effectiveness/risks of germline editing Relevant references were elsewhere in the text; I have relocated the relevant 
ones to this point, and added 2 more.
8)      P. 4: “…the claimed genetic alterations have not been independently confirmed…” 




9)      P. 8: “Worldwide, a great number of children are languishing in orphanages, 
undoubtedly experiencing lives that are, on average, of substantially reduced happiness 
compared with the lives of children in non-institutional settings.” Citation with 
evidence of this claim is needed.
I have amended this to qualify the statement. I have not added a citation, 
however, as this is a well-known fact, but quantification is not available.
10)     P. 10, fn.37, on Average Utilitarianism: “This is irrational, because there is clearly 
far more Utility in the former world than the latter.” This claim is question-begging, by 
assuming that (within utilitarianism) only total utilitarianism is rational. Of course, there 
is not space in a footnote to elaborate on these intricacies. I would suggest instead 
I have changed the paragraph and footnote accordingly.

































































cutting all discussion of the failings of alternative utilitarian views, and instead briefly 
noting that discussion of all their flaws can be found in Parfit (2016). Similarly, the 
paragraph on the top of page 10 (which will be very difficult for many non-philosophical 
readers to parse) could also be trimmed down to briefly note that Parfit attempts his 
own solution, but the overall issue remains unresolved.
11)     P.11, on the impact of a rule banning GM: “Of course, this conclusion must be 
tentative, as predictions of how people would actually feel and respond in the face of 
such a rule can be made only on the basis of educated guesses.” On the contrary, most 
high-income countries have laws or regulations effectively banning germline 
modification. What is unknown is the counterfactual: how many people would use GM 
*instead of* adopting, were the former made available. And evidence can be put 
forward to answer this counterfactual, by studying the effect of liberalising other 
reproductive technology (e.g., IVF) on adoption rates. See, e.g., Cohen and Chen (2010), 
“Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease 
Adoption Rates and Should It Matter?”, Minnesota Law Review 95:485-577.
The first point is true, and I have slightly altered an earlier sentence to 
emphasise that the rule is relevant only in the future context of germline GM 
technology becoming available. In terms of the research referred to, this is of 
relevance and I have incorporated it – albeit as a footnote, because, although 
interesting, the findings are preliminary and not broadly generalisable. 
12)     P. 14: The last paragraph’s first sentence should say “…germline GM actually 
works, …”
(Following the next review point, this has been removed.)
13)     Pp. 14-15: The paragraph at the bottom of 14/top of 15 takes a very long time to 
make a point that could just as easily be made briefly – especially since the gist (not 
enough evidence to make a conclusion on utility) has already been explicated earlier in 
the paper.
Paragraph removed.
14)     P. 18: “there is good reason to believe that the low or zero occurrences of 
mutations and clinically relevant mosaicism reported in most of the recent literature 
would likely apply to a real-life attempt at germline GM.” It may be worth mentioning 
the He Jiankui case here, which is the only known real-life attempt, and according to 
reports mosaicism did occur. A response is available, of course – He Jiankui was, among 
other things, simply bad at the bioscience, and this points towards the need for GM to 
only be done under well-regulated environments by competent individuals. But still, it’s 
a concern.
This has now been addressed by amendments to the paragraph.
15)     P. 19: “…accidental CRISPR-induced mutation could not lead to a negative 
outcome…”: ‘not’ should be deleted.
Corrected.
16)     P. 22: “The strongest version of the PP holds any degree of risk to be 
unacceptable, irrespective of the potential benefits.” Does anyone actually hold this 
rather absurd and conceptually incoherent (as all actions involve some risk) view? This 
is a far cry from the view of Sachs (2011), the one author cited defending the Strong PP; 
they define it as: “(1) regulation should presumptively be applied when an activity or 
As mentioned above, I have now taken much of the PP material out; it is an 
area which, on reflection, does not merit such extensive coverage. I have also 
reworked what remains.

































































product poses serious threats to human health or the environment, even if scientific 
uncertainty precludes a full understanding of the nature or extent of the threats; and 
(2) the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of regulation lies with the 
proponent of the risk-creating activity or product.” This neither argues for categorical 
ban in the face of risk (only regulation), nor is it insensitive to offsetting benefits 
(instead, puts a burden of proof on those arguing for benefits).
17)     P. 23: “Another PP-based objection against proceeding with a germline GM 
attempt focuses not on risks to the immediate children who may be created with the 
initial attempts at germline GM, but with the spectre of distant harms or other negative 
outcomes.” Dystopian objections to GM seem completely separable from the PP, so 
this would make more sense as a separate section rather than a sub-point in discussion 
of the PP. Dystopians do not rely on a presumption against risky technology; they 
instead highlight what they take to be a serious risk of the technology, one that 
militates against GM even if one weighs risks and benefits evenly. 
As above.
18)     P. 25: “A moratorium on the use of GM technology would be antithetical to 
progress in biomedical innovation, and hence unethical.” This is in direct contrast to the 
preceding, where the author concedes a 1-2 year delay (i.e., moratorium?) on GM is
Amended.
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